Trusted Generals and Fragile States: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh after British India

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31098/jgrcs.v6i2.4376

Keywords:

Civil-Military Relations, British India, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Military Coups, Civilian Supremacy, Trusted Generals, Fragile States

Abstract

This article examines the historical evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh from the late colonial period to the postcolonial era. Using a qualitative historical-comparative method, structured-focused comparison and process tracing of selected civil-military episodes, it explains why three states with related British Indian institutional inheritances produced sharply different civil-military outcomes. India maintained broad civilian supremacy over the armed forces, Pakistan experienced repeated military rule, and Bangladesh witnessed both direct and indirect military interventions. The article argues that these divergent outcomes cannot be explained by military ambition alone. Military intervention became likely where weak civilian institutions, elite distrust, constitutional instability, politicized bureaucracy and national-security crises allowed generals to enter politics as arbiters. Pakistan’s experience under Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf shows how the army became a durable veto player in state politics. Bangladesh’s experience under Ziaur Rahman, H. M. Ershad and the 2007 military-backed caretaker government shows a related but distinct pattern of episodic intervention during moments of political breakdown. India, by contrast, avoided military takeover because of stronger founding institutions, constitutional continuity, party dominance in the early decades and deliberate political management of the armed forces. The article concludes that the recurring South Asian problem is not simply the ambitious general, but the civilian habit of using military power to resolve political crises.

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2026-10-14

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Haider, S. A. (2026). Trusted Generals and Fragile States: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh after British India. Journal of Governance Risk Management Compliance and Sustainability, 6(2), 89–101. https://doi.org/10.31098/jgrcs.v6i2.4376

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